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THE LOUISIANA CODE OF EVIDENCE-A
RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE VIEW*
George W. Pugh**
Robert Force***
Gerard A. Rault, Jr.****
Kerry J. Triche*****
For evidentiary rules to serve their high purpose, they should be
fair, practical and very accessible. With the adoption of the Louisiana
Code of Evidence these goals are much nearer fruition. To achieve an
in-depth understanding of the Code and appreciate the nuances of many
of its individual provisions, it is helpful to have a knowledge of the
legislative history of the Code and to compare the final product with
the provisions of the Code as originally proposed. Further, since many
of the provisions of the Louisiana Code of Evidence are grounded in
the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is similarly helpful to have an ap-
preciation of its formulation, first by the Supreme Court and later by
the Congress.1
The Louisiana Code of Evidence is the end product of a very long
historical development, both in this state and elsewhere. The acknowl-
edged master in the movement for evidentiary reform in Britain in the
early nineteenth century was Jeremy Bentham. Within a short time of
the publication of Bentham's "Theory of Judicial Evidence ' 2 in 1818,
Louisiana's great Edward Livingston (America's Bentham, as he was
characterized by Wigmore)3 prepared and proposed to the Louisiana
Legislature a Code of Evidence for this state, designed to govern pro-
* Reprinted from G. Pugh, R. Force, G. Rault, K. Triche, Handbook on Louisiana
Evidence Law (West 1989) with the generous permission of the copyright holder, West
Publishing Company.
** Julius B. Nachman Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Coordinator
and Co-Reporter, Code of Evidence Project, Louisiana State Law Institute.
*** Thomas Pickles Professor of Law, Tulane University; Director, Tulane Maritime
Law Center; Co-Reporter, Code of Evidence Project, Louisiana State Law Institute.
**** Professor of Law, Loyola University; Director, Loyola Death Penalty Clinic; Co-
Reporter, Code of Evidence Project, Louisiana State Law Institute.
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1. See Pugh, Federal Rules of Evidence: Foreword, 36 La. L. Rev. 59 (1975).
2. The first publication of Bentham's "Theory of Judicial Evidence" was in French.
See 1 Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo American System of Evidence in Trials at
Common Law 239 (3d ed. 1940).
3. Id. at 240.
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ceedings in both civil and criminal cases. Had it been adopted, the
development of evidence law in the United States might well have been
very different. However, for reasons that are now obscure, the Livingston
Evidence Code was not adopted by the Louisiana Legislature, and more
than a century and a half was to elapse before an evidence code for
Louisiana would finally be adopted. 4
In 1956 the Louisiana State Law Institute was directed by the
Louisiana Legislature to prepare a Code of Evidence applicable to both
civil and criminal cases.' Although the task was duly undertaken by the
Institute, the project was set aside in 1966 because of a number of
factors, including the circumstances that in 1965 Chief Justice Earl
Warren had appointed an Advisory Committee composed of some of
the nation's outstanding jurists, practitioners and scholars to formulate
rules of evidence for federal district courts throughout the country, and
promising efforts had resulted from that endeavor. 6
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence drew
upon the splendid codification proposals earlier made by the American
Law Institute in its Model Code of Evidence (1942) and by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws in its Uniform Rules
of Evidence (1953). An amended final draft proposed by the Advisory
Committee was promulgated by the Supreme Court on November 20,
1972 and transmitted to Congress. Because of the opposition that de-
veloped, Congress undertook to reconsider the Rules in detail. After
many amendments, the Federal Rules of Evidence were finally enacted
by Congress and went into effect July 1, 1975.
By delaying its own codification project, Louisiana was able to take
advantage of this national effort to simplify and modernize the law of
evidence. In 1979, the Louisiana Legislature, via House Concurrent
Resolution number 250, indicated legislative interest in a Code of Ev-
idence for civil and criminal cases based on the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, and requested that the Judicial College prepare a draft of such
a code expeditiously and submit it to the Louisiana State law Institute
for its recommendations and comments. Although this effort towards
codification did not achieve fruition, in light of the interest expressed
by the legislature and by members of the legal profession in a Code of
Evidence, the Law Institute in 1981 decided once again to undertake
the preparation of a Code of Evidence. Three Louisiana law professors
4. For a brief discussion of the Edward Livingston code and a citation of authorities
see Pugh, supra note 1, at 60. For a discussion of the impact of Edward Livingston's
legal writings outside of Louisiana, see Lyons, The European Response to Edward Liv-
ingston's System of Criminal Law, 24 Loy. L. Rev. 621 (1978).
5. 1956 La. Acts No. 87.
6. For a brief history of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Van Pelt, Federal Rules
of Evidence: Introduction, 36 La. L. Rev. 66 (1975).
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were named to serve as Co-Reporters on the project, one of whom was
also designated Coordinator. An Advisory Committee of very distin-
guished professionals reflecting the various points of view involved was
also established .7
The first matters to be resolved by the Law Institute were basic
policy issues concerning the nature of the product sought to be achieved.
Upon recommendation of the Reporters, both the Advisory Committee
and the Council of the Law Institute agreed, inter alia: (1) that a unitary
Code should be prepared, i.e., a Code embracing both civil and criminal,
jury and nonjury cases, specifying where appropriate whatever divergent
rules should be established; (2) that no attempt should be made com-
prehensively to codify constitutional evidentiary rules; and (3) that policy
considerations should generally take precedence over uniformity with the
Federal Rules of Evidence, but that where there is no substantial dif-
ference between Louisiana and federal policy decisions as to a particular
rule of evidence, to avoid picky, meaningless distinctions that might
thereafter be inferred, the Louisiana rule generally should be stated in
the same word formula used in the Federal Rules of Evidence. In light
of Louisiana's civil law tradition and the fact that it was contemplated
that the end product would be adopted by the legislature rather than
the supreme court, it was decided to style the document a "Code"
rather than "Rules" as was generally done elsewhere in the country.
To promote uniformity of style, the three Reporters generally worked
on the same chapter, each Reporter taking initial responsibility for certain
articles within the chapter. After in-depth research and drafting, frequent
meetings of the Reporters and Staff Attorneys were held at which policy
issues were debated and tentative drafts of the various articles discussed
in minute detail. Revisions and "re-writes" were frequent and time-
consuming, but as a result of extensive discussion among the Reporters,
a draft article to which all could assent was generally achieved. On
occasion, however, minority positions were presented to the Advisory
Committee and Council.
All articles were submitted to the very helpful and hard-working
Advisory Committee for its consideration. Although the issues presented
to the Committee involved very basic policy determinations as to what
was a fair, just and practical reconciliation of competing values, and
7. The following individuals were, for part or all of the time during this phase of
the project, members of the Advisory Committee: Edward Joseph Bleich, Judge; James
Boren; James L. Dennis, Justice; Howard B. Gist, Jr.; Douglas M. Gonzales, Judge;
Marvin J. Goudeau III; Cheney C. Joseph, Jr.; Howard W. L'Enfant, Jr.; Paul Lynch,
Judge (deceased); John Martzell; Julian R. Murray; Sydney B. Nelson; Alvin V. Oser,
Judge; Wilson R. Ramshur, Judge; Joe W. Sanders, Chief Justice (retired); Lawrence P.
Simon, Jr.; Thomas H. Sponsler; J. Nathan Stansbury; George M. Strickler; Francis C.
Sullivan; Monica T. Surprenant; Earl E. Veron, Judge.
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were sometimes hotly debated, the end results of the Committee's de-
liberations were generally adopted with practical unanimity. Of impor-
tance in achieving such agreement was the fact that the Reporters had
presented, through rather copious "Comments" and via very frank and
open dialogue, the various options available and their views as to the
probable impact adoption of proposed recommendations would have
upon the law.
Following consideration of the individual chapters by the Advisory
Committee, the Council of the Law Institute (the ultimate decision-
making body of the Institute) deliberated, article by article, on the draft
proposals. Because of the advance work by the Reporters and the
Advisory Committee, the proposals generally met with approval by the
Council. There were, however, a number of changes made in the drafts
at this stage of the process. Again, approval of individual articles was
generally by an overwhelming affirmative vote.
Because there was much pressure to present a finished product to
the legislature as soon as possible and because provisions relative to
testimonial privileges, presumptions and burden of proof were easily
severable from the rest of the Code, it was decided that the Code should
be submitted to the legislature without provisions as to these subjects.
By the end of 1985 the Code as thus delimited was completed on
schedule.
Drafts of the articles were available to interested members of the
profession as the Code was being confected. Understandably, however,
general professional attention did not actively focus on the project until
the Council of the Institute had completed its work. Although the
Advisory Committee had been in part composed of able individuals
reflecting the point of view of the prosecution, and the provisions of
the Code received practically unanimous approval in both the Advisory
Committee and the Council of the Law Institute, when the proposal
was considered in its entirety by representatives of the Louisiana District
Attorneys Association, very strong opposition developed within that
group. In addition to objecting to a number of specific provisions of
the proposed Code, the District Attorneys Association wished to have
additional time to study the proposal. Despite the opposition, the Code
of Evidence prepared by the Louisiana State Law Institute was introduced
as scheduled at the 1986 Regular Session of the legislature.8 There, in
addition to the opposition from the Louisiana District Attorneys As-
sociation, the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association, besides expressing
concern about particular provisions of the proposed code, also wanted
additional time to study the code in its entirety. Consequently, the
legislature in 1986 deferred action on the proposals.
8. La. H.R. 1155, Reg. Sess (1986).
[Vol. 49
CODE OF EVIDENCE
Although pursuant to concurrent resolution, 9 representatives of in-
terested groups met in an attempt to reconcile their differences, successful
solution prior to the 1987 legislative session proved unattainable. By the
1987 legislative session even stronger opposition had developed from the
Louisiana District Attorneys Association, which by then had developed
a proposed code of its own that was introduced in the 1987 Legislative
Session.' 0 Efforts at compromise between the Louisiana District Attorneys
Association and the Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
proved fruitless, and again legislative action on the matter was deferred.
Continued legislative interest in the matter, however, remained strong,
as manifested in another concurrent resolution" aimed at reaching a
conciliation of opposing views. The mechanism envisioned in the res-
olution for achieving such a reconciliation, however, was cumbersome
and never implemented. At the 1988 Regular Legislative Session, the
legislature was again presented with two Codes of Evidence, one prepared
by the Louisiana State Law Institute,' 2 and the other sponsored by the
Louisiana District Attorneys Association.'3 At this point a compromise
was finally achieved.
As the result of conciliatory compromise efforts by many persons,
and the leadership of several individuals and groups, an amended version
of the Law Institute's Code was finally adopted in 1988. The compromise
agreement was confected at a somewhat marathon meeting held on the
eve of the proposed Code's consideration by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee. At this critically important compromise session were represen-
tatives of the organizations which had been legislatively active with
respect to the proposal: the Louisiana District Attorneys Association,
the Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Louisiana
Trial Lawyers Association, the Louisiana Coalition Against Domestic
Violence, and the Women's Lobby Network. In recognition of the
agreement reached by representatives of these very diverse groups, the
next day at the formal hearing on the bill before Judiciary Committee
A of the Senate when the various amendments were introduced in globo,
the bill was further amended to reflect that it was introduced on rec-
ommendation not only of the Louisiana State Law Institute, but also
of the Louisiana District Attorneys Association, the Louisiana Associ-
ation of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Louisiana Trial Lawyers
Association. 4
9. La. S. Con. Res. 107, Reg. Sess. (1986).
10. La. H.R. 1356, Reg. Sess. (1987).
II. La. S. Con. Res. 185, Reg. Sess. (1987).
12. La. S. 155, Reg. Sess. (1988).
13. La. S. 363, Reg. Sess. (1988).
14. Later in the legislative process, presumably to accord with legislative practice in
such matters, reference to the latter three organizations was dropped. See La. H.R.
Amend. No. 1, Reg. Sess. (June 25, 1988).
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Although some additional amendments to the Code were adopted
subsequent to those initially proposed at the Senate hearing, and one
amendment adopted at the 1988 Second Extraordinary Session, by far
the most numerous and most important from the standpoint of a general
understanding of the Code were those confected at the compromise
meeting held the day before the Senate Committee hearing.
Because of the legislative amendments to the Code, it was necessary
to revise the Official Comments to reflect the changes, and this involved
rather extensive revision of the Comments. Further, since many of the
Comments accompanying the Code as presented to the legislature were
explanatory of the law as it then existed, and didactic in character, at
the suggestion of officers of the Institute, the Comments were somewhat
abridged. As an aid in discerning legislative intent and as an analysis
of the law as it existed prior to the adoption of the Code, the original
Official Comments retain a certain value and are available in the Acts
of the Louisiana Legislature, published by the Secretary of State."s
As noted above, the law governing privileges, presumptions and
burden of proof remains to be addressed, and there seems to be general
agreement that it now should be done. In many respects privileges is
more controversial than any of the subjects already codified, for it is
of great interest, not merely to law professionals, but to very diverse
segments of our society. Further, both presumptions and burden of
proof have a pervasive influence on virtually all areas of the law and
it will be difficult to arrive at solutions and generalizations satisfactory
to the Advisory Committee, the Council of the Law Institute, the legal
profession, and finally to the legislature and the public at large. To
broaden input, the Advisory Committee has been expanded and, as in
the past, heavy reliance will be placed upon the combined wisdom of
its members.
While preparing the material on privileges, presumptions and burden
of proof, it will be possible to evaluate the provisions of the rest of
the Code in actual practice and to recommend the legislative changes
that seem called for.
Considering the Code as it now exists in general terms, two very
important aspects should be noted. First, the Code reflects a generally
hospitable attitude to the reception of relevant evidence, manifested
perhaps most dramatically in the streamlining of the traditional excep-
tions to the hearsay rule. Secondly, and as somewhat of a counterbalance
to the first, the Code, in article 403, authorizes the judge to exclude
relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, etc. These two notions complement
15. The original comments were also published in 1988 La. Session Law Serv. 515
(West).
[Vol. 49
CODE OF EVIDENCE
each other, for the Code's relaxation of the rigid contours of the
exclusionary rules may bring about unfair, unjust results unless the
courts are vigilant in excluding evidence that is substantially outweighed
by one or more of the factors enumerated in article 403. In this con-
nection it is well to recall that article 102 of the Code, which sets forth
its purpose and how it is to be construed, emphasized the role to be
played by fairness and justice in the application and interpretation of
the Code. Such lofty precepts must be ever kept in mind lest the liberality
of admissibility embraced by the Code work unfair results in the context
of individual cases.
By adopting the Code, not only has Louisiana shown itself more
hospitable to the admissibility of relevant evidence, it also has shown
itself more receptive to evidentiary developments elsewhere in the coun-
try. Although the Louisiana Code in a number of respects departs from
positions taken in the Federal Rules of Evidence and the other thirty-
one state enactments that follow it, the adoption of the new Code aligns
Louisiana with the majority of American jurisdictions. Although Louis-
iana courts will in no sense be bound by judicial decisions in other
jurisdictions interpreting evidentiary provisions similar to or even iden-
tical with those adopted in the Louisiana Code,' 6 the interpretation given
those provisions by courts in other jurisdictions will undoubtedly be
read and considered by Louisiana lawyers and judges. Further, national
evidentiary treatises will assume an even greater importance in Louisiana
than they already occupy. Although traditionally Louisiana has generally
followed the rules of the common law in evidentiary matters,17 the
influence of national thought and developments with respect to the law
of evidence will thus inevitably assume even greater importance in Louis-
iana following the adoption of the new Code.
16. See La. Code Evid. art. 102 Comment (a).
17. See Comment, Were the Louisiana Rules of Civil Evidence Affected by the
Adoption of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure?, 14 La. L. Rev. 568 (1954).
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